Exchanging rhetoric for reason with Iran

Report’s findings may actually aid U.S. diplomacy

INTERVIEW. So Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons: Now what?

According to Martin B. Malin, executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the National Intelligence Estimate's  not-so-shocking revelation may give the United States and its European allies greater latitude in their discussions with the Iranian government. 

How do the NIE’s findings affect both your job and the jobs of others following Iran’s nuclear ambitions?
I think the majority of the people who look at this problem objectively have understood that Iran has had considerable difficulty enriching uranium and that it is extremely unlikely that they have nuclear materials in Iran.

Now, nobody knows whether or not Iran has a covert nuclear program that might be enriching uranium out of public view. We do know what it’s doing at Natanz and that the International Atomic Energy Agency visited there, and we know how many centrifuges are spinning there, etc., so the NIE doesn’t come as a great surprise.

In comparison to a nuclear program such as Pakistan’s, which followed a similar blueprint, why has Iran’s nuclear push proven so difficult?
In order to make a bomb, you need either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. To get plutonium, you need a reactor and the technology to separate the plutonium and get the stuff you can make the bomb with. To enrich uranium, you need to procure it or enrich it yourself — and the process of enriching  it through fast-spinning centrifuges is very difficult. Iran has had technical difficulties with their centrifuge program for a number of years.

What the NIE said is that while they are interested in achieving the capability to produce nuclear fuel, they’re not looking to produce a weapon. So, what’s been holding them up has been largely the technological challenge of enriching uranium and not the political costs of going after a weapon — an endeavor they abandoned in 2003.

Does the abandonment of that program bode well for Iran’s nuclear future?
It’s generally a positive thing. It shows that diplomacy seems to be working, that Iran is carefully assessing its own risks, costs and benefits of pursuing its own nuclear capability and is sensitive to the international pressure that’s been placed on it. I feel like it’s a good thing for the expert community that’s been looking at Iran. Most people have been saying that we ought to be pursuing the diplomatic track and that Iran is not a threat in the near term, and this has been confirmed by the Intelligence Estimate.

Will the NIE’s revelation help or hurt the diplomatic process?
That’s a good question. I hope it will cause the diplomatic track to take a more intensive turn. I hope the Iranians will be amenable to negotiating a suspension of their enrichment program,­ and I hope the United States will be willing to deal with the Iranians, either through the U.N. or perhaps even directly to negotiate that suspension and a broader package of inspections and a broader relationship.